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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article presents a critique of chapter 1 of the Proposed 
Restatement of Employment Law. The critique is organized to follow the 
organization of the proposed Restatement, which begins with a provision of 
black letter law, a series of comments and illustrations explaining the 
meaning and application of the black letter law, and the reporters' notes 
providing support for the black letter law and the commentary. This 
critique will follow that structure, with each part focusing on a section of 
the chapter: the introductory note; section 1 .01 ;  section 1 .02; section 1 .03; 
and section 1 .04. The subdivisions of the parts will, likewise, generally 
follow the subdivisions of the sections in the chapter, although sometimes a 
critique of the reporters' notes will be its own subpart, and sometimes it 
will be discussed in the subsections analyzing the comments. 
II. INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
A. Scope 
The Proposed Restatement's Introductory Note alludes to the fact that 
much of the law defining who is an employee consists of judicial and 
administrative interpretations of various employment and labor relations 
statutes. The Restatement should state specifically that these definitions can 
vary from statute to statute, even when the interpretations claim to be 
relying on common-law usage, and that statutory definitions may also vary 
from the common law. 
The definition of "employee," when used to define the coverage of a 
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statute, might vary depending on the purpose of the legislation at issue. 1 
The common-law definition thus makes more sense when used in wage and 
hour laws than in civil rights legislation. We recognize, however, that in 
certain instances, because of long-established judicial interpretations, any 
major modification of the traditional distinction between "employee" and 
"independent contractor" would probably require amendatory legislation. 
More broadly, the Introductory Note should explain that employment 
law has been in ferment during the last few decades, especially regarding 
employment at will, and the Restatement's formulation of existing law 
should not foreclose desirable future common-law or statutory 
developments. 
B. Terminology 
The Introductory Note correctly observes that the purpose of 
"employment law" is to "set the rights and duties of the parties to the 
employment relationship rather than to set the bounds of enterprise 
vicarious liability to third parties."2 Later, the Reporters' Notes to section 
1 .01  point out that the distinction between employees and independent 
contractors originated in the "early, seminal English cases" designed to 
"protect consumers or purchasers from vicarious liability for the acts of 
service providers they could not control."3 The Note should emphasize at 
the outset that this derivation of the definition of "employee" could lead to 
an inappropriate limitation on the scope of the term in situations where the 
very opposite - broad coverage - should be the goal, as in employee-
· protection statutes and antidiscrimination legislation. 
III. SECTION 1 .01 4 
A. Text of the Provision and Critique 
§ 1.01 General Conditions for Existence of Employment Relationship 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by law or by §1.02 or §1.03, an 
individual renders services as an employee of an employer if 
(a) the individual acts, at least in part, to serve the interests of 
I .  See, e.g., D'Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co., 927 A.2d 1 1 3 (N.J. 2007) (a worker who might 
be classified as an independent contractor at common law may qualify as an employee under a 
whistleblower statute). 
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, ch. I ,  at 1 -2 (Council Draft No. 3, 2008). 
3. Id.§ I.OJ reporters' notes, cmt. a, at 1 9. 
4. This critique of section 1 .0 1  was written by Theodore J. St. Antoine and Joseph E. Slater. 
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the employer, 
(b) the employer consents to receive the individual's services, 
and 
(c) the individual does not render the services as an independent 
business. 
(2) An individual renders service as an independent business 
when the individual exercises entrepreneurial control over the 
manner and means by which the services are performed in 
order to serve his or her own interests. 
(3) Entrepreneurial control over the manner and means by 
which services are performed is control over important business 
decisions, including whether to hire assistants and where to 
assign them, whether to purchase and where to deploy 
equipment, and whether to service other customers. 
We are generally satisfied that the proposed black-letter language of 
section 1 .01  effectively captures the essence of the employment 
relationship as distinguished from that of an independent contractor 
providing services to a consumer or other purchaser. Over time the courts 
have used such tests as the "right to control" and the "economic reality of 
dependence" to draw the distinction. Other industrialized societies have 
applied similar tests to distinguish between an employee and one who 
provides services as an independent business. But the United States appears 
more reluctant than most countries to depart from common-law agency 
principles and to adopt broadly an emphasis on statutory purposes. 5 
B. Comments on Section 1. 01 - Critique 
1 .  Overview 
In Comment a, the authors note that one of the common law tests for 
the existence of an employment relationship, the right-to-control test, was 
originally developed for the purpose of determining when it is appropriate 
to hold a principal liable in respondeat superior for the torts of its agent. 6 
In discussing the test, the authors describe sections 220 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency and 7.07 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency.7 
However, those sections seem to serve quite different purposes. Section 
220 reads like a true definitional provision, as its title, "Definition of 
5. See, e.g., Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Characterization of 
Workers in Need of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357, 365-73 (2002). 
6. RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § I.OJ cmt. a. 
7. Id. 
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Servant," indicates. 8 Section 7 .07, in contrast, is entitled, "Employee 
Acting Within Scope of Employment."9 Comment f to section 7.07 does 
refer to the factors cited in section 220 as a test for employment status, 
including the degree of control the principal has over the methods the agent 
applies to her work, whether the agent supplies her own tools and 
materials, and whether the work the agent performs is customarily 
performed under the supervision of the principal. 10 But Comment f to 
section 7.07 is not cited in the text of Comment a to section 1 .01 of 
Restatement (Third) of Employment Law. 1 1  To avoid confusion, Comment f 
to section 7.07 should be cited there. What is significant is that section 
7.07, like section 220 in actual effect, is meant to help determine when one 
person is responsible, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for the 
acts of another person providing services to the former. Even though courts 
have relied on these factors in determining who is an employee in other 
contexts, this is not the best way to go about defining "employee" in any 
general sense. The issue is sufficiently important to be treated directly. At 
the very least, the Restatement should candidly acknowledge that section 
1 .01  of the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law is based to a 
considerable extent on the indirect treatment of employees and servants in 
sections 7 .07 and 220 of the Restatements (Third) and (Second) of Agency, 
respectively. 
This of course reiterates the concern expressed earlier about an 
excessively narrow definition of "employee" when used in certain worker­
protection and antidiscrimination statutes. Even the Reporters' Notes 
dealing with Comment a to section 1 .01  recognize that the precedent­
making English cases developed the right-to-control test for the purpose of 
protecting consumers and purchasers from vicarious liability "for the acts 
of service providers." 12  That seems quite contrary to the approach that 
ought to be taken in considering the coverage of employee-protection 
statutes. 
2. Illustrations 
Illustration 1 6  to Comment f should be omitted. Comment f concerns 
the requirement in any employment relationship that the employer consent 
to receiving the employee's services. 13 Illustration 1 6  provides the 
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 220 ( 1958). 
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY§ 7.07 (2006). 
10. Id.§ 7.07 cmt. f. 
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW§ I.OJ cmt. a. 
1 2. Id.§ I.OJ reporters' notes, cmt. a, at 1 9. 
13. Id. § I.OJ cmt. f. 
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example of a union "salt" situation, in an attempt to illustrate the point that 
"[c]onsent is not negated by an employee's misrepresentations."14 It is 
inappropriate to equate union salting with a "misrepresentation." First, in 
the Illustration itself, the employees make no representation, let alone a 
misrepresentation. They simply withhold from the employer the fact that 
they are union organizers.15 Moreover, under Federal law, the employer 
may not discriminate against them because of their status as union 
organizers. 16 The Supreme Court has held that union salts are employees 
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 
recognizing the statute's policy to protect union organizing from employer 
interference. 17 Neither the Illustration nor the Reporters' Notes reflect that 
point, which leaves the impression that seeking employment with a union­
organizing objective is somehow improper. Such a notion is manifestly 
incorrect. 
C. Reporters' Notes - Critique 
The Reporters' Notes to Comment a state that courts often use a multi­
factor analysis to determine whether a person is an employee under 
employee-protection statutes, including workers' compensation statutes 
that originally relied on a "narrow, one factor right-to-control test."18 
However, all of the cases cited in support of that proposition come from the 
far western United States (Alaska, Arizona, California, etc.).19 To make 
clear that this is not simply a regional aberration, it would be well to 
substitute or add decisions from elsewhere. 20 
14. Id. § I.OJ cmt. f. illus. 1 6. 
15. Id. 
16. 29 U.S.C. § 1 58(a)(3) (2000). 
1 7. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 91 ( 1 995). 
1 8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § I.OJ reporters' notes cmt. a, at 22. The 
authors cite ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ( 1 976) as general support for 
the treatment of the issue in workers' compensation statutes. This reference should be replaced by 
appropriate references to the current version, of the looseleaf treatise, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMP. 
LAW (MB). More than 340 libraries hold the latter; neither the University of Michigan's Law Library 
nor any of its peers any longer carry the 1976 edition (even its title- Workmen's Compensation -is an 
anachronism). We would suggest citing Contractor Distinction: Relative Nature of Work, 3 LARSON'S 
WORKERS' COMP. LAW 62. 1 ;62.2, § 62.01 (May 1 999) ("The modem tendency is to find employment 
when the work being done is an integral part of the regular business of the employer, and when the 
worker, relative to the employer, does not furnish an independent business or professional service" and 
"[T]he control test is in practice giving way to the relative-nature-of-the-work test . . .  [The reasons 
include] the logical irrelevance of the tort-connected test of control of the objectives of social legislation 
generally"); § 62.06 (June 2007). 
1 9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW§ 1 .0 1 ,  reporters' notes cmt. a, at 22. 
20. For example, the authors could include Arkansas Transit Homes, Inc. v. Aetna Life and Cas., 
16 S.W.3d 545, 547-48 (Ark. 2000) and Re/Max v. Wausau Ins. Co., 744 A.2d 1 54, 1 57 (N.J. 2000) as 
central and eastern examples. 
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The Reporters' Notes to Comment c assert that in the case of unskilled 
workers, the multi-factor test used in determining who is an employee for 
purposes of worker-protection laws, is often unnecessary because of the 
close control typically exerted over such employees. 21 In support of the 
proposition, the authors cite Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen. 22 However, 
the notion that a multi-factor analysis is not necessary appears to be much 
more the position of concurring Judge Easterbrook than that of the majority 
in the Lauritzen case. 23 We recommend that the authors cite directly to the 
concurring opinion to avoid suggesting that the majority holding supports 
this proposition. In addition, although the notes assert that the Migrant and 
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSA WP A), 24 was also at 
issue in Lauritzen, 25 we cannot find any reference to that statute in either 
the trial or appellate decisions that are reported. The Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA) seems the only statute involved. The MSA WP A is relied on, as 
well as the FLSA, in a couple of the other decisions reported in this same 
paragraph in Comment c. 
The Reporters' Notes to Comment d state that both the NLRA and the 
Social Security Act were amended to exclude independent contractors from 
the definition of "employee."26 While the notes are correct that the 
language of the NLRA explicitly excludes independent contractors from 
the definition, 27 the Social Security Act currently defines an "employee" as 
a person who would be considered an employee at common law.28 We 
would infer from the context that the reference may be to an older version 
of this section. If so, the text should say so and the citation should provide 
the date.29 
2 1 .  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LA w § 1 .0 I reporters' notes cmt. c, at 23. 
22. Id. (citing Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1 529 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
23. See Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1 539 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1 823 (2000). 
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1 .0 1  reporters' notes cmt. c, at 23. 
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1 .0 1  reporters' no!eS cmt. d. 
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1 52(3) (2000). 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 410(j) (2000). 
29. The comments, illustrations, and reporters' notes also contain a number of typographical and 
minor citation errors which the reporters will wish to correct in future drafts. 
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IV. SECTION 1.0230 
A.  Text of the Provision and Critique 
Section 1.02 Volunteers Are Not Employees for Purposes of Laws 
Governing Employment Relationship. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, for purposes of laws 
governing protections, benefits, and obligations in the 
employment relationship, an individual is a volunteer and not 
an employee if the individual renders uncoerced services 
without being offered a material inducement. 
This default rule for interpreting the identified category of laws does 
two things. First, it declares who the law should characterize as a volunteer. 
Second, it declares what should be the consequence of that status with 
respect to employment legislation. 
B. Comments on Section 1.02- Critique 
The rule's criteria for defining those excluded from the protections 
and responsibilities of employment laws are discussed in Comments b, c, e, 
and f which respectively are titled "material inducement,"31 "promises of 
future material gain,"32 "volunteers perform uncoerced services,"33 and 
"employer pressure."34 The rule's proclamation that volunteers are 
excluded from employment legislation is rationalized in Comment a, and 
the purported support for that proposition is presented throughout the 
Comments and Reporters' Notes. 
1 .  Comment a - Relevance of Agency Principles 
Comment a contains two propositions. The first asserts that volunteers 
are not treated as employees for purposes of laws governing employee 
protections and obligations35 - an assertion that has no direct connection to 
the comment's title. The sole rationale offered in support of that 
proposition is that volunteers do not make the same commitment to an 
employer as do employees and, therefore, are not treated as employees for 
30. Alvin Goldman authored the critiques of sections 1.02 through 1 .04. 
31. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW§ 1.02 cmt. b. 
32. Id. cmt. c. 
33. Id. cmt. e. 
34. Id. cmt. f. 
35. Id. cmt. a. 
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the purposes of such protections and obligations. 36 The logic of that 
assertion has some cogency with respect to those laws whose protections 
are based on long term commitments, such as pension benefits or family 
and medical leave. However, there is a want of reasons to connect long 
term commitment to other sorts of protections like those involving work 
related exposure to injury or illness or protection from status discrimination 
or from retaliation based on exercising significant legal privileges or 
obligations including whistle-blowing. 
Furthermore, the assumption underlying the rationale that long term 
commitment to the employer is an appropriate prerequisite to the 
protections offered by employment laws is not self-evident. Except where 
short term employees are expressly excluded from certain statutory 
regimes, the law does not exclude temporary or casual workers from 
employee rights or obligations. 37 Moreover, the activities that most often 
attract volunteers (distribution of food to the needy, assisting in hospitals, 
nursing homes, and day care centers; leading youth organizations, teaching 
religious school, surrogate sisters and brothers, building homes for the 
underprivileged, charitable fund raising, and the like) typically do so 
because of the volunteer's emotional or ideological dedication to the 
enterprise mission. Volunteers, therefore, often take great pride in that 
activity and their rigorous participation often persists for decades. The 
Reporters offer no case decisions in support of the offered "commitment" 
rationale for the declared rule, 38 and, as discussed below, a number of 
decisions extend some employee protections to volunteers. 39 
Comment a observes that, as stated in the Restatement (Third) of 
Agency, beneficiaries of volunteer services can be held vicariously liable 
for a volunteer's misconduct,40 but it goes on to declare, without 
explanation or cited authority, that suitability for such tort liability is not 
determinative of employee status. Nevertheless, more careful analysis 
suggests that the same reasons that justify holding a principal vicariously 
liable for a volunteer's conduct may also justify construing some types of 
employee protective laws to encompass some who perform services on 
36. Id. 
37. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) (not defining employee by the duration of employment or 
identity of employer for purposes of the NLRA); 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2000) (excluding under the FLSA 
public agency and non-profit food bank volunteers from definition of "employee," but not seasonal or 
short term workers). 
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW§ 1.02 reporters' notes cmt. a. 
39. See Acts Outside Regular Duties, 2 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMP. LAW (MB) § 27.03(4)(b) 
(June 2008). 
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.02 cmt. a (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF AGENCY§ 7.07(3)(b) (2006)). 
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what ordinarily would be considered a volunteer basis. For example, the 
principal ' s superior ability to prevent a mishap, or to spread the financial 
burdens of unavoidable risks among those who benefit from the work, 
justifies extending the protection of safety and health regulations and injury 
and illness insurance benefits to all who perform the work regardless of 
whether they are treated as employees for other purposes. Indeed, as 
discussed below, some courts construe such legislation in this manner. 
Accordingly, the Reporters have not provided support for the black letter 
declaration of the stated default interpretive rule either in the form of clear 
doctrinal analysis or a clear consensus of authority. 
Of less importance, but worth noting, is an inconsistent use of 
descriptive language in this portion of the Draft. Comment a characterizes 
the recipient of volunteer services as an employer, 41 and later in the same 
paragraph characterizes the recipient as a principal. 42 Because there is no 
"employer" if the voluntary service does not result in an employment 
relationship, the first term is inappropriate. The term "principal," indicating 
an agency relationship, may be appropriate for third party claim purposes 
but does not accurately depict a voluntary relationship for other purposes, 
such as the obligations or privileges between the immediate parties. It is 
suggested, therefore, that the phrase "beneficiary of the services" would be 
a more neutral characterization for use throughout the paragraph. 
Finally, Comment a uses the term "true volunteer" without defining it. 
Are there "untrue" volunteers? If so, what is the significance of the true 
volunteer status? 
2. Comment b - Material Inducement 
Comment b expands on the black letter rule's  assertion that being 
offered a material inducement removes one from the status of volunteer. It 
explains that an "individual may be induced or motivated to work by the 
promise of any type of material gain, whether in the form of monetary 
compensation, some special benefit such as insurance, or an in-kind 
payment."43 Comment b, however, does not accurately reflect the full 
scope of modem contract doctrine respecting consideration because it 
41. The second sentence of comment a reads, "Individuals who render services to an entiry 
without coercion and without material inducement have not been extended the same kind of 
commitment from an employer as those who work for material gain," RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
EMPLOYMENT LA w § 1.02 cmt. a. 
42. The last sentence of the first paragraph in comment a reads, "Volunteers, however, may have 
certain protections from or obligations toward their principals that do not depend on employee status," 
Id. 
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW§ 1.02 cmt. b. 
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ignores consideration in the form of material gain to third persons or parties 
to whom the individual has a legal obligation or emotional tie. 44 
Additionally, it fails to recognize consideration in the form of a forbearance 
or the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relationship. 45 No 
explanation is given for using a more narrow concept of inducement for 
employment contracts than for other contracts or for creating this 
inconsistency between this and the Restatement (Third) of Contracts. If the 
Reporters intend the term "material inducement" to be as broad a concept 
as that used in describing contractual enforceability, clarification would 
best be accomplished if the black letter rule itself cross-referenced the 
companion Restatement. 
The broader Restatement (Third) of Contracts perspective of what 
material inducement includes and thus who is an employee would, of 
course, expand the scope of coverage of employee protective laws. The net 
financial impact of a broadened or narrowed perception of employment is 
not examined in the Comments. Absent such guidance for a policy choice 
one might turn to the goal of equal justice. Under that standard is it not 
doubtful whether the appropriate presumption is that the legislature would 
favor placing greater risks and burdens on those who, without deriving 
personal benefit from their work, perform the same services and generate 
the same social or economic values as those whose work is remunerated? 
The Reporters' Notes cite an article by Mitchell Rubinstein without 
analysis or discussion. The article offers an additional reason for construing 
employee protective statutes as covering volunteers:46 
It is ... important to understand the legal rights of volunteers since there 
is potential for abuse. Specifically, some volunteers may be exploited by 
employers looking for a source of inexpensive - or worse, free - labor. 
Given that this nation wants to, and needs to, encourage volunteerism, it 
must curb the exploitation of volunteers. 47 
Moreover, the Rubinstein article demonstrates that there is a 
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 71 cmt. e. (1981). 
45. Id. § 71(3); see also Arriaga v. County of Alameda, 892 P.2d 150 Cal. 1995) (worker's 
compensation available to claimant who was injured while doing community service in lieu of being 
subject to other penalties); Whitlock v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n, 377 P.2d 148 (Ore. 1962) 
(building owner's workers' compensation insurance liable for the volunteer's claim where nonprofit 
organization was paid to paint a building and volunteer suffered lead poisoning while doing that work). 
The Reporters' Notes to Comment e cite Arriaga as an example of a coerced "volunteer. " 
Although that element removed the worker from the status of "volunteer," the beneficiary government 
agency's responsibility to provide workers' compensation benefits was still dependent on establishing 
an employment relationship. That relationship was supported by the agency being a third party 
beneficiary of the prosecutor's offer to do community service in lieu of a less desirable legal obligation. 
46. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Our Nation's Forgotten Workers: The Unprotected Volunteers, 9 U. 
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 147 (2006). 
47. Id. at 150-51. 
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disconnect between the unsettled state of the case law on the subject and 
the Reporters' unqualified black letter statement of section 1.02 respecting 
the relationship between volunteer status and employment protections. 48 
The Reporters' Notes assert that volunteers are not treated as 
employees if they do not receive pay or significant benefits and cite three 
cases in support of that proposition. 49 Those cases do not support that broad 
proposition; rather, as discussed below, they support the more narrow 
proposition that courts have interpreted specific legislative protections of 
employees as expressly limiting their application to claimants who are 
remunerated for their services or have excluded volunteers for other 
reasons tied to the text of the statute being invoked. 
Thus, the rejection of sex discrimination claims by volunteer 
firefighters in City of Calhoun v. Collins50 was not based on the broad 
principle that remuneration or significant benefits are required for a person 
to be protected by an employment law statute. Rather, the decision was 
explained on the grounds that the conduct of the members of the volunteer 
group was not under the direction of the government entity being sued,51 
that the statutes under which the claims were made are designed to remedy 
employment type discriminatory practices and not other types of 
discrimination, 52 and that restoration of membership in a voluntary group is 
not the sort of remedy anticipated by anti-discrimination statutes that 
protect employees. 53 
Mendoza v. Town of Ross,54 also cited for the broad proposition that a 
volunteer must be remunerated to receive employee protections, denied a 
disability discrimination claim by a quadriplegic volunteer whose traffic 
assistance and crime watch position had been eliminated. 55 That decision 
48. Id. at 17 1 -73. 
[I]n order to determine whether the purported volunteers are employees under employment 
discrimination statutes, courts have applied the primary purpose test, the economic reality 
test, and the hybrid test. Other courts have focused exclusively on whether the individual in 
question received any remuneration and examined what constitutes remuneration. 
Additionally, others have adopted a two-step approach requiring that the putative employer 
control the work and that the purported volunteer be hired. 
/dat 1 7 1 .  
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) O F  EMPLOYMENT LAW§ 1 .02 reporters' notes cmt. b .  (citing Tawes v. 
Frankfort Volunteer Fire Co., 16 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 660 (D. Del. 2005); Mendoza v. Town of 
Ross, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 452 (Ct. App. 2005); City of Fort Calhoun v. Collins, 500 N.W.2d 822 (Neb. 
1 993)). 
50. 500 N.W.2d at 825-27. 
5 1 .  Id. at 827; id. at 828 (Caporale, J, concurring). 
52. Id. at 826 (citing Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795 (E.D. Pa. 1 987)). 
53. See id. at 826-27. 
54. The case is incorrectly cited in the Reporters' Notes. The correct citation is Mendoza v. Town 
of Ross, 27 Cal. Rptr.3d 452 (Ct. App. 2005). 
55. Id. at 454-55 
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turned not on the absence of pay or benefits but rather on the fact that the 
claimant never held the volunteer position because he had not been 
appointed to it by the town authorities as required by the governing 
regulations. 56 
Finally, in Tawes v. Franliford Volunteer Fire Co. ,57 the trial court 
was not addressing a broad proposition respecting the status of volunteers 
under employee protective legislation; rather it was focusing on the tests 
other courts have used in applying particular statutes protecting workers 
from employment discrimination. 58 Borrowing, out of context, language 
from a Supreme Court decision concerning the responsibility of fishing 
boat owners for the captain's and crew's social security and unemployment 
insurance tax contributions, the district court adopted as its guiding 
proposition that in "the application of social legislation[,] employees are 
those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business 
to which they render service."59 Based on that proposition, without further 
analysis, the district court cited lower court statements that a volunteer who 
does not receive compensation is not protected by laws banning 
employment discrimination. 60 
In contrast, at least in the case of volunteer emergency responders, 
several state legislatures (including those of jurisdictions involved in some 
of the cases cited in the Reporters' Notes) as well as some state courts, 61 
and some federal statutes, 62 adopt the principle that volunteers should 
receive at least some indemnity protections and benefits given to 
employees. Similarly, a few state courts, emphasizing the purpose of the 
legislation, have provided workers' compensation benefits to volunteer 
workers even in the absence of explicit statutory coverage for such 
persons.63 
56. Id. at 457-58. 
57. 16 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 660 (D. Del. 2005). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. (citing U.S. v. W. M. Webb, Inc., 397 U.S. 1 79, 1 85 (1 970)). The Court in Webb held that 
maritime law should govern whether for such purposes the fishing vessel's captain and crew, whose 
remuneration was based on defined shares of the value of the catch, should be treated as employees of 
the boat's owner. 397 U.S. at 1 89-94. On remand it was held that the owner had an employer's 
responsibilities to make payroll deductions. W. M. Webb, Inc. v. U.S., 424 F.2d 1070, 1 071  (5th Cir. 
1 970). 
60. Tawes, 1 6  Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 660. 
6 1 .  Conflicting case authorities respecting the treatment of emergency responders, and statutory 
references, can be found at Acts Outside Regular Duties, 2 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMP. LAW (MB) § 
27.03(4)(b) (June 2008). 
62. For example, 1 6  U.S.C. § 558c (2000) includes forest service volunteers as employees for 
purposes of tort claims, workers' compensation claims, and claims for lost personal property. 
63. See, e.g., Matthews v. County of Nassau, 562 N.Y.S.2d 771 (App. Div. 1 990) (county 
museum volunteer covered by workers' compensation); Orphan! v. St. Louis State Hosp., 441 S.W.2d 
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3 .  Comment d - Interns and Student Assistants 
This Comment uses the term "intern" without defining it. A possible 
definition would be: 
An intern is someone whose uncompensated efforts primarily provide 
that person with tutelage and experience that are transferable in serving 
other persons or entities and do not to a material degree give value to the 
source of the tutelage or the source of the opportunity for experience that 
is greater than is the value of the intern' s enhanced learning. 
This definition would have the virtue of being consistent with the way the 
California legislature in its Higher Education Employer-Employee 
Relations Act defines when students are to be considered employees rather 
than student interns at the University of California. 64 It is consistent, too, 
with the draft's apparent effort to distinguish between student work for 
purposes of training and student work that substitutes for hiring additional 
staff. 
Comment d states this last proposition as follows: "[S]tudents who 
render uncompensated services to satisfy bona fide education or training 
requirements . . .  generally are not treated as employees."65 In contrast, the 
California courts have granted workers' compensation protection to 
students who, without pay, work "shoulder to shoulder with paid workers . 
. . in an established business or institution" and render "services that are of 
economic benefit to the third party."66 While there is a division of authority 
on this point, other courts have issued similar decisions including requiring 
that apprentice wages be paid to students whose intern or extern activities 
generate significant value. 67 The Reporters' Comments do not adequately 
reflect this division of authority nor assess the merits of the competing 
approaches. 
The Reporters' Notes appear to have a heading missing inasmuch as 
they treat issues raised under Comment d in the notes headed "Comment 
355 (Mo. 1969) (volunteer dance therapist at mental hospital was entitled to workers' compensation 
benefits where the statute defined employee as "every person in the service of any employer, as defined 
in this chapter, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, or under any appointment 
or election"); Pruit v. Harker, 43 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. 1931) (holding an uncompensated child working for 
his parent to be an employee within the meaning of Missouri's workers' compensation statute). 
64. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562e (West 2009). 
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LA w § 1 .02 cmt. d. 
66. Land v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd., 1 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 432, 435-36 (Ct. App. 2002). 
67. See, e.g., Betts v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 271 N.W.2d 498, 500-01 (Mich. 1978) (holding 
student teacher fulfilling a degree requirement without pay to be an employee for purposes of workers' 
compensation in part because defendant school benefited from student teacher's services); Heget v. 
Christ Hosp., 58 A.2d 615, 61 6-17 (N.J. Ct. C.P. Hudson County 1948) (holding unremunerated student 
nurse fulfilling certificate requirement was employee of defendant hospital for purposes of workers' 
compensation because hospital benefited from student nurse's services). 
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c." One of those notes addresses the issue of the status of student athletes 
and offers as the default rule the assertion that courts find no employment 
relationship even in the case of financial aid in exchange for participating 
in money-generating athletic programs. 68 Because this issue has not been 
extensively litigated, it is misleading to present it as a settled principle. 
Thus, the notes cite but two case decisions of questionable persuasiveness 
in support of the statement, one of which has been overruled with respect to 
what it had characterized as the primary consideration for determining 
whether an employment relationship exists. 69 Moreover, as discussed 
below, this default rule is inconsistent with the approach many courts take 
in distinguishing volunteer status from employment status based on the 
commercial value of the work efforts and on the monetary and other valued 
inducements for participation. Nor does this default rule reflect the 
economic realities of the commercialization of certain athletic programs on 
many campuses. 
The older of the student-athlete cases cited in the Reporters' Notes 
emphasized the absence of proof that either side intended to create an 
employment relationship, the governing athletic association's regulations 
prohibiting pay for participation, and the required continuation of financial 
aid irrespective of the athlete' s  contribution to the team's success. 70 This 
led the court to conclude that the student athlete was "first and foremost a 
student."71 However, the court did not discuss factors that may distinguish 
the lives of those recruited to campus as athletes from the lives of other 
students, including those receiving other types of scholarships, or the 
frequency with which student athletes graduate from the particular 
institution as contrasted with other recipients of financial aid. 
The second case cited in support of the statement that courts find no 
employment relationship even where student athletes on scholarship play in 
a money-generating sport is a Texas appellate decision that rejected an 
athlete' s  workers' compensation claim brought in 1991 based on a 
paralyzing injury he suffered playing college football in 1974.72 The 
court' s  decision emphasized the compensation act's explicit requirement 
that there be "a contract of hire" and found that a jury could conclude that 
his letter of intent and financial aid agreement did not constitute a contract 
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW§ 1.02 reporters' notes cmt. c. 
69. Id. (citing Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Tr., 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983), overruled by 
GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 402-03 (Ind. 2001); Waldrep v. Tex. Employer's Ins. Ass'n, 21 
S.W.2d 692 (Tex. App. 2000). 
70. Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1170-73. 
71. Id. at 1173. 
72. Waldrep, 21 S.W.2d at 692. 
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of hire because the NCAA regulations under which the athlete undertook to 
play expressly prohibited taking pay in exchange for playing and did not 
permit cancellation of the athlete's grant-in-aid based on his athletic ability 
or his contribution to the team's success, or in certain circumstances, even 
if he quit. 73 However, the Texas court cautioned: "Our decision today is 
based on facts and circumstances as they existed almost twenty-six years 
ago. We express no opinion as to whether our decision would be the same 
in an analogous situation arising today; therefore, our opinion should not be 
read too broadly."74 
Although the Texas court did not explain why it offered its concluding 
remark, a caution ignored by the Reporters' Notes, there are ample reasons 
to ask whether, at least in those revenue-generating intercollegiate football 
and basketball programs that dominate media attention, the players are 
integral to the educational program or integral to a financially lucrative 
auxiliary activity. Facts relevant to assessing whether the services in 
question are obtained in the course of an economic enterprise rather than an 
educational program would include comparing the budgets, remuneration 
levels, and work expectations of the coaching staff with those of other 
institutional departments; examining the integration or separation of the 
athletic department's governance system in relation to that of the rest of the 
campus; the degree of regimentation of the lives of student-athletes in 
comparison with those of other students; and the graduation rates for 
"student" -athletes as contrasted with those of other financially aided 
students. Thus, the Larson treatise on workers' compensation questions the 
relevance in these situations of the parties' "proven intentions" that the 
athletes are present as students, not workers, and observes that generally in 
workers' compensation cases courts find employment even though the 
expressed intention of the parties was to establish an independent 
contractor relationship. 75 Citing the widespread public controversy 
respecting lax enforcement or widespread disobedience of NCAA 
regulations, the Larson treatise observes: "[T]here is something faintly 
naive about the repeated contention that the claimant could not have been 
playing for pay because the NCAA forbids it."76 
73. Id. at 702. 
74. Id. at 707. 
75. Recreational and Social Activities, 2 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMP. LAW (MB) § 22.04(1)(c) 
(June 2007). 
76. Id. 
An enormous cast of participants harvests a wealth of riches from major college sports. 
Universities derive enormous revenues and other indirect, but vital, benefits from successful 
athletic programs . . . .  The NCAA supports itself entirely by revenues generated from selling 
broadcasting rights of its members' games. Many coaches are compensated lavishly for 
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The Reporters' Notes acknowledge a competing view to the extent of 
offering a "but see" citation to an older Colorado decision that allowed a 
workers' compensation claim on behalf of an injured athlete.77 However, 
the notes provide an incomplete summary of the case. There the student 
athlete had several campus jobs which could have been held by non­
students. 78 The Colorado court was quite clear that these university jobs, 
which provided him with free lodging, meals, and spending money, were 
dependent on his playing football and, therefore, concluded that when the 
student was injured during Spring practice, the injury arose out of his 
employment. 79 The Colorado decision can, of course, be distinguished 
from the other two cases based on the absence of an athletic association 
regulation preserving the student's in-kind aid and income in the event he 
could not play. 80 On the other hand, as previously discussed, an effort to 
accurately characterize the nature of the relationship should also look at the 
extent to which the athletic program and lives of the athletes were similar 
to or different from the rest of the campus. 
Given the weakness of the rationale of the cited decisions, the Texas 
court's words of caution, and the failure to explore a number of grounds for 
finding that the relationship with the school was not primarily academic, it 
is inaccurate to present the law in this area as settled. Moreover, this is an 
area where, consistent with ALI traditions, the Reporters could offer 
guidance to a more progressive path to justice. 
4. Comment e - Volunteers Perform Uncoerced Services 
Comment e states: "Coerced individuals are employees if their work 
producing successful programs. Media enterprises generate rich advertising revenues by 
airing college athletic events. Indeed, college sports constitute a $60 billion industry. 
Amy McCormick & Robert McCormick, The Emperor's New Clothes: Lifting the NCAA 's Veil of 
Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 496-97 (2008). 
77. RESTATEMENT (TIDRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1 .02 reporters' notes cmt. c (citing Univ. of 
Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953)). 
78. Nemeth, 257 P.2d at 424 (athletes were paid monthly, other students were paid hourly). 
79. Nemeth, 257 P.2d at 426. 
80. See id. Shortly after the Colorado court decided Nemeth, it rejected the workers' compensation 
claim of another college football player who died from a playing injury. In a decision not included in 
the Reporters' Notes, State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm 'n, 3 14 P.2d 288 (Colo 1 957), the 
court explained that unlike the earlier case, the evidence did not show that the athlete would not have 
attended the school absent the grant-in-aid provided by the football team. Also, his campus jobs and 
tuition scholarship were available to students who did not participate in athletic programs. Thus, the 
court found he primarily was on campus as a student, a finding that may have been further influenced 
by the fact that the school for which the decedent played, Fort Lewis A & M College, did not have the 
type of program that demanded widespread media attention or generated significant revenue. The fact 
that the school carried accident insurance for its football players, additionally may have persuaded the 
court that the school and athlete had accepted an alternative method of protecting the athlete's interests. 
Id. at 289-90. 
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serves the interests of an employer who consents to receive their 
services."81 This statement is followed by the observation that "This may 
not be the case for prisoners who are forced to do work in a prison for 
purposes of punishment or rehabilitation rather than to serve the interests of 
an employer."82 While the phrasing of that sentence is pregnant with the 
opportunity to find that under various circumstances inmate workers have 
employment protections, it is narrowed by the Reporters' Notes which 
state: "Presumably the purposes of employment laws do not extend to work 
done under a prison's control pursuant to a penal sentence."83 Neither the 
notes nor comment offer a rationale for this rule and, therefore, the Draft 
provides no guidance regarding the resolution of this difficult issue. 
Potentially affected by the stated exclusion of prison work from 
employment protections are the roughly 2.3 million persons incarcerated in 
the U.S. 84 As explained below, courts are in need of thoughtful guidance 
respecting this area of the law of work. Thus, the lack of such guidance in 
the Draft is a significant gap in the document. 
One category of prison labor is prison housework. 85 It involves 
maintaining the facility or meeting the needs of other inmates through jobs 
such as cooking, baking, laundering, dishwashing, grounds keeping, 
carpentry, painting, and nursing assistance. Because such work is otherwise 
performed by hired civilian workers, the terms and conditions of prison 
housework has a significant market impact as well as an impact on the 
conditions of incarceration. The other category of prison labor is work in 
prison industries. 86 Such work involves producing products or services sold 
by the prison system; work that otherwise would be performed by free 
labor. Indeed, was it not for the comparative severity of U.S. prison 
sentences, 87 a significant portion of those who are incarcerated would be 
active participants in the free labor market. Therefore, because prisons 
generally require medically able inmates to work, the terms and conditions 
of such employment has a significant competitive impact on portions of the 
labor market including the market for prison staff. 88 
8 1 .  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LA w § 1 .02 cmt. e. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. § 1 .02 reporters notes cmt. e. 
84. 0EP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SUMMARY FINDINGS (2007), at 
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm>. 
85. See Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic 
Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 V AND. L. REV. 857, 870 (2008). 
86. See id. at 869. 
87. See PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID P. FARRINGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIME 
AND JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1981-96, at 30 (1 998), available at 
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cjusew96. pdt>. 
88. It has been estimated that "well over 600,000, and probably close to a million, inmates are 
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Most prison inmates perform some prison housework and a 
significant portion work in prison industries that produce goods or services 
sold to government agencies89 or private consumers. For example, in 2002 
it was reported that the Federal Prison Industries, operated by the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, employed approximately 23,000 inmates out of a total 
of 157,000 prisoners and that about 65,000 inmates were employed in state 
operated prison industries. 90 Although only a small portion of prisoners 
currently are estimated to do contract work for the private sector, there is 
reason to expect this number to grow.91 
A recent study by Professor Noah Zatz found that since the mid 1980s, 
federal courts have acknowledged that with respect to some labor 
protective statutes such as the FLSA, prison workers employed by private 
contractors fulfill the definition of "employee" where they perform that 
work outside the prison prernises.92 It has also been held that work-release 
prisoners are employees who may participate in an NLRB election. 93 These 
decisions turn not on any finding that prisoners inherently can or cannot be 
employees but rather on the purpose of the particular statute. 
On the other hand, courts generally deny relief for inmates 
employed by prison industries or in prison housework either because such 
assignments are presumed to be an aspect of penal rehabilitation (an 
assumption most often made with little or no attention to the functional 
realities), because such activity is not an economic relationship, or because 
the government defendant enjoys sovereign immunity from monetary 
liability.94 This leaves an inmate-worker in a significantly less protected 
situation than someone performing identical work in a non-inmate capacity. 
For example, under general tort law, absent intentional infliction of injury 
or deliberate indifference to prisoner safety, courts do not require prisons to 
compensate their prisoner-employees for work-related injuries. 95 Thus, if 
working full time in jails and prisons throughout the United States." Zatz, supra note 85, at 868. 
89. The Federal Prison Industries Act provides for the sale of such goods to government agencies. 
18 U.S.C. § 4122 (2000). 
90. ROBERT D. ATKINSON, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE POLICY REPORT, PRISON LABOR: 
IT'S MORE THAN BREAKING ROCKS 1 (2002), available at <http://www.ppionline.org/documents/ 
prison_labor_502.pdf>. 
9 1 .  A Forbes.com article estimated the number at 6000 nationally. Maureen Farrell, Putting 
Prisoners To Work (Aug. 19, 2008), <http://www.forbes.com/2008/08/1 8/prison-small-business-ent­
manage-cx_mf_08 1 8prisonlabor.html>. This estimate appears to not include work performed by those 
incarcerated in privately operated prisons. Such prisons, which have been growing in number, hold 
over 6.7 percent of the total prison population. See Rachel Antonuccio, Comment, Prisons for Profit: 
Do the Social and Political Problems Have a Legal Solution?, 33 J. CORP. L. 577, 582 (2008). 
92. Zatz, supra note 85, at 875-78, 893-95. 
93. Speedrack Prods. Group v. NLRB, 1 14 F.3d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1 997). 
94. Zatz, supra note 85, at nn.1 0 1-04. 
95. Colleen Dougherty, Comment: The Cruel and Unusual Irony of Prisoner Work Related 
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an oven were to explode in a prison kitchen permanently injuring a non­
inmate baker and an inmate baker's helper, only the former would be 
eligible for disability benefits. 96 
The decisions respecting the FLSA' s  application to prison labor 
largely ignore history' s  lessons respecting the social as well as economic 
realities of the role prison labor can and has played in using inmates as a 
cheap alternative source for a work force to perform particularly onerous 
tasks, like road gangs and swamp drainage; a role that perverts the 
corrective and rehabilitative functions of incarceration and undermines the 
employee welfare goals of labor protective legislation. 97 In addition, as 
Professor Zatz observes, penological goals are probably better served by 
granting prison labor the same status as other workers. 98 Thus, careful 
analysis of the status of inmate labor that gives greater attention to the 
history of abuse of such labor and the potential rehabilitative role of prison 
work could lead to the conclusion that the goals of labor protective laws 
and the penological process are better served when courts include prisoners 
within those laws. 
Although the Department of Labor and some judicial decisions point 
to prisoner dependency as a justification for excluding them from the 
FLSA, the Department of Labor has rejected such a justification with 
respect to patient-workers, such as those in mental institutions. Rather, its 
regulations grant employment protections to patients who perform work 
within the institution if it "is of any consequential economic benefit to the 
institution."99 The inconsistency of excluding internal prison labor from the 
FLSA while giving such protection to confined patients deserves at least 
some mention in a document designed to guide courts to improved justice. 
In contrast with judicially shaped decisions respecting minimum 
wages and tort liability, twelve states plus the federal government provide 
some workers ' compensation benefits to prisoners injured in the course of 
doing assigned duties other than personal housekeeping. '00 Over forty 
Injuries in the United States, 1 0  U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 483, 484-85 (2008). 
96. At the same time, if the explosion was caused by the negligence of a well-healed inmate 
maintenance worker who was serving time for tax fraud, the non-inmate baker and the inmate helper 
might be eligible for a substantial tort recovery against the negligent inmate depending on the 
jurisdiction's  approach to the fellow-servant doctrine and co-worker immunity. See, e.g., Buckley v. 
New York, 437 N.E.2d 1088 ( 1982). Five jurisdictions do not extend workers' compensation immunity 
to co-workers and limit the scope of that immunity. Who are "Third Persons ": Types of Statutes, 6 
LARSON'S WORKERS' COMP. LAW (MB) §§ 1 1 1 .02(1), 1 1 1 .03(1) (June 2008). 
97. Zatz, supra note 85, at 886-96. 
98. /d. at 908, 910, 932. 
99. 29 CFR § 525.4 (2008). 
100. Necessity for "Contract of Hire ", 3 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMP. LAW (MB) § 64.03(6) (June 
2008). 
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years ago the Council of State Governments recommended such a 
reform. 10 1  A governmental advantage to this approach is that it provides a 
shield against potentially more generous tort liability for such injuries.  102 
Normative protective standards respecting prison labor have been 
proposed by the International Labour Organization (ILO) which adopts 
conventions intended to ensure social justice and humane treatment of 
workers. The ILO's Forced Labour Convention of 1 930 prohibits all forced 
labor, but at Article 2, paragraph 2( c ), excludes from the definition of 
prohibited forced or compelled labor 
any work or service exacted from any person as a consequence of a 
conviction in a court of law, provided that the said work or service is 
carried out under the supervision and control of a public authority and 
that the said person is not hired to or �laced at the disposal of private 
individuals, companies or associations. 1 3 
The original Convention's seeming rejection of all private contracting 
of prison labor was modified in the 2007 Report of the ILO' s Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. 104 That 
document addressed the issue of when prison labor for a non government 
entity is permitted regardless of whether the non-government entity is an 
employer that brings its work into the prison, whether the prisoners are 
released to work outside the prison, or whether work is performed for a 
privately operated prison. 105 The 2007 Report asserts that, under ILO 
principles, in such situations the prison labor must be subject to 
government supervision and control that is effective, systematic, and 
regular, including oversight by those government officers who normally 
inspect working conditions. In addition, prison labor for nongovernment 
entities must be voluntary, as evidenced by a written statement of consent, 
and the prisoner must not be subjected to pressure or the prospect of any 
penalty, such as loss of a right or privilege, for refusing the opportunity to 
engage in such work or having the refusal taken into account in deciding 
1 0 1 .  Id. (citing COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 23 (1 963)). 
1 02. See, e.g., Drake v. Essex County Corr. Ctr., 469 A.2d 5 1 2  (N.J. Super. 1983) (holding that 
action of injured prisoner under Tort Claims Act is possible because workers' compensation benefits 
unavailable to prisoner). 
1 03. International Labour Organization [ILO], Convention Concerning Forced Labour Art. 2, ILO 
C29 (May I ,  1 932), available at < http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl .htrn > (scroll down to 
C29 and click) (emphasis added). 
1 04. ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (articles 
19, 22 and 35 of the Constitution), Report Ill (Part lB): General Survey Concerning the Forced Labor 
Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), 96th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. ILC96-III(I B)-2007-02-0014-1-En, available at <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/ 
---ed_norrn/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_ 089 l 99 .pdt>. 
105. Id. at 24-27. 
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matters concerning reduction of sentence. 106 
Finally, the ILO Guidelines call for such labor to be performed under 
conditions that approximate a free labor relationship including a 
comparable level of wages (allowing for reasonable deductions for the cost 
of housing and food and taking into account differences in productivity and 
costs of training and supervision), social security benefits, and the 
occupational health and safety protections afforded free workers. 107 If a 
Restatement were to guide federal and state courts based on such 
international norms, its analysis of statutory protections might more readily 
recognize the appropriateness of extending to prison inmates statutory 
worker safety and health protective regimes, as well as minimum wage 
benefits. 
V. SECTION 1 .03 
A. Text of the Provision and Critique 
Section 1.03 Owners Are Not Employees For Purposes of Laws 
Governing Employment Relationship 
Unless otherwise provided by law, for purposes of laws 
governing protections, benefits, . and obligations in the 
employment relationship, an individual is not an employee of an 
enterprise if the individual through an ownership interest 
controls all or a significant part of the enterprise. 
This section is concerned with situations in which employees have 
ownership interests in the entity in which they are employed. Strangely, the 
stated black letter rule focuses on the individual' s  ownership attributes as 
contrasted with the employment attributes. Nevertheless, it is the latter that 
is the focus of the core authorities that guide judicial interpretation of 
statutory protections, benefits, and obligations of employment. Therefore, it 
is puzzling why the focus of a draft Restatement (Third) of Employment is 
on ownership attributes rather than upon employment attributes. 
The impact of employee ownership interests on employee protective 
legislation was addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Goldberg v. 
Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc. , where the Court upheld FLSA 
regulations prohibiting home manufacture of goods made by members of a 
producer cooperative. 108 The Court reached this result because it found that 
1 06. Id. at 24-3 1 .  
107. Id. at 30-3 1 .  
108. 366 U.S. 28 ( 1961).  
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those performing the work were vulnerable to employee risks and 
explained: 
There is nothing inherently inconsistent between the coexistence of a 
proprietary and an employment relationship. If members of a trade union 
bought stock in their corporate employer, they would not cease to be 
employees within the conception of this Act. For the corporation would 
"suffer or permit" them to work whether or not they owned one share of 
stock or none or many. We fail to see why a member of a cooperative 
may not also be an employee of the cooperative. 109 
Instead of looking to the ownership characteristics of the co-op 
members, the Court examined the economic realities of their work efforts 
and observed: 
The members are not self-employed; nor are they independent, selling 
their products on the market for whatever price they can command. They 
are regimented under one organization, manufacturing what the 
organization desires and receiving the compensation the organization 
dictates. Apart from formal differences, they are engaged in the same 
work they would be doing whatever the outlet for their products. The 
management fixes the piece rates at which they work; the management 
can expel them for substandard work or for failure to obey the 
regulations. The management, in other words, can hire or fire the 
homeworkers. 1 1 0  
Accordingly, the black letter rule should examine the individual' s  attributes 
as an employee. Moreover, as explained below, including in a leading case 
cited by the Reporters, courts have found ownership control to be irrelevant 
to an individual 's  rights under some employment statutes.  
B. Comments on Section 1.03 - Critique 
1 .  Comment a - Overview 
Comment a asserts that as a general matter employment protections 
and obligations do not apply to employees who through their ownership 
interest control their own remuneration and activities on behalf of the 
enterprise. 1 1 1 This test is inconsistent with the black letter rule stated in 
section 1 .03 which recites the test as whether "the individual through an 
ownership interest controls all or a significant part of the enterprise." 1 12 For 
example, partners control their own remuneration and activities on behalf 
of the enterprise if they individually attract their own clients or patients, 
1 09. Id. at 32. 
1 10. Id. at 32-33. 
1 1 1 . RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1 .03 cmt. a. 
1 12. Id. § 1 .03. 
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exercise professional prerogatives in providing counsel or treatment, and 
retain a share of the resulting fees - the Comment a test for not including 
an individual as an employee. Nevertheless, that individual may have little 
or no control over such core enterprise decisions as the purchase or 
disposal of property, the hiring or dismissal of professional and support 
staff, the expansion or contraction of the enterprise's areas of 
specialization, the location or amenities of its facilities, the schedule of fees 
for services, and the like - factors that are essential to applying the test 
recited in the black letter rule stated in section 1 .03. 
When courts and counsel reference an adopted ALI Restatement 
principle, often they do not go beyond the black letter assertion. Therefore, 
the rule itself should accurately reflect any critical qualifications. In this 
instance the Reporters have presented two conceptually different 
approaches to resolving the question of whether an individual is primarily 
an owner or an employee. Therefore, the first step in accomplishing its task 
under section 1 .03 will be for the Reporters to decide whether the guidance 
should be based on the black letter rule stated in section 1 .03 or the tests 
described in Comment a. On the other hand, as discussed below, neither of 
those tests accurately reflects either a prevailing approach or an approach 
best suited to carry out legislative goals. Accordingly, both the black letter 
rule and the Comment a approach should be reconsidered. 
The Reporters' Notes for this Comment indicate that the Supreme 
Court decision in Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates P. C. v. Wells 1 13 
is the primary source for the stated section 1 .03 test of whether ownership 
status defeats treating an individual as an employee for purposes of 
employee protective legislation. 1 14 In Clackamas, the issue was whether a 
professional corporation's shareholder should be included in determining if 
the enterprise had the threshold number of employees needed to trigger its 
coverage under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 1 15 The 
Clackamas Court expressly rejected a proposed test that the question to be 
answered was whether the shareholder-director appeared to be the 
functional equivalent of a partner. 1 16 Rather than focus on the institutional 
role of the person in question, the Court looked to the extent to which the 
individual had the characteristics of an employee who is dependent on the 
entrepreneurial decisions of others. 1 17 In approaching its task, the Court 
declared that with respect to terms such as "employee," 
1 13. 538 U.S. 440 (2003). 
1 14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1 .03 reporters' notes cmt. a. 
1 1 5. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 441 .  
1 1 6. Id. at 446. 
1 1 7. Id. at 448. 
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congressional silence often reflects an expectation that courts will look to 
the common law to fill gaps in statutory text, particularly when an 
undefined term has a settled meaning at common law. Congress has 
overridden judicial decisions that went beyond the common law in an 
effort to correct "the mischief' at which a statute was aimed. 1 18  
67 
Putting aside that statement' s  ambiguity regarding the default rule for 
construing federal legislation, 1 19 the Court announced that the common law 
should be the guide in identifying who is an employee under the ADA and 
called for the fact finder on remand to weigh six factors (with no one factor 
being decisive 120 and with other factors possibly being relevant as well 12 1 ) 
to determine if the shareholder should be counted as an employee. 
Although the Comment a test of whether the individuals in question control 
their own remuneration and activities on behalf of the enterprise is relevant 
to several of the six factors listed by the Court, the Comment a test does not 
reach other factors the Court listed as matters to be weighed such as: 
whether the organization can hire or fire the individual, the extent to which 
the individual is able to influence the organization, and whether the 
individual shares in the organization's profits, losses and liabilities. 122 
Moreover, as the Reporters ' Notes to Comment c reveal, there is a 
lack of consistency in the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to construing 
who is a covered employee when that term is undefined in a federal statute. 
Thus, while the Clackamas decision says that "the mischief at which the 
legislation is aimed" is not a factor to be considered in construing who is an 
employee, 123 a year later in Yates v. Hendon, the Court relied on "textual 
clues" to find guidance concerning the legislature' s  intent respecting the 
scope of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act's protections. 124 
As a result, without consulting a common law test of employment, it 
treated a working owner as a protected pension plan participant. 125 
If the Reporters have concluded that a particular default rule is best 
I 18 .  Id. at 447 (emphasis added) (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 3 18, 324-25 
(1 992)). 
I I 9. As discussed irifYa, the Court often has found that a statute reflects a legislative expectation 
that some other test or tests will be used in determining whether one is an employee. 
1 20. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 45 1 .  
1 2 1 .  Id. at 450 n. 10. 
1 22. Id. at 440. 
123. Id. at 447. 
124. 541 U.S. I ,  12 (2004). 
1 25. In Clackamas the Court did not examine either the textual clues respecting the scope of what 
Congress sought to do when it adopted the ADA or any clues in the Act's legislative history respecting 
the purpose of the fifteen employee threshold. 538 U.S. at 440. Had it done so, it may have been 
persuaded to use a test that reaches more broadly in counting employees inasmuch as the Act contains 
such textual statements of purpose as "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities" 42 U .S .C. § 12 I 01 (b )(1 )  (2000). 
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suited to doing justice, they have neither identified that rule with clarity nor 
offered a fully explicated doctrinal analysis and defense of their choice. 
Furthermore, to the extent the Comment finds any support in the 
Clackamas decision, it is important to note that the Supreme Court was 
applying its rule for construing federal legislation. Thus, Clackamas does 
not control the rule to be applied when interpreting a state statute, and state 
courts, as discussed below under Comment c, are apt to give weight to the 
legislative goal of extending social welfare benefits to all workers who are 
vulnerable to economic misfortunes or abuses of managerial control. The 
proffered black letter rule stated in section 1 .03, however, does not reveal 
this competing approach to construing such legislation. 
2. Comment c - Statutory Variation 
Comment c references a number of situations in which the black letter 
rule stated in section 1 .03 does not reflect the approach courts have adopted 
in construing employee-related legislation and the Reporters' Notes cite 
some state case decisions respecting the availability of owner-worker 
claims under workers' compensation legislation. However, because there is 
no discussion or analysis of the doctrinal grounds for these variations, the 
stated rule and Comments provide no real guidance in assessing the 
wisdom of selecting a particular approach. Moreover, so as to not mislead, 
the black letter rule itself should reflect that it is not a consensus standard. 
In addition, Comment c and the Reporters' Notes fail to observe that 
state courts have adopted alternative default rules in construing who is an 
employee protected by other categories of statutory or common law claims 
for relief. As the guardians of the common law, state courts can, as 
previously observed, determine that the common law definition of 
employee goes beyond the Supreme Court's Clackamas approach and that 
the default rule should include giving weight to the mischief that is being 
remedied. Thus, even where state courts seek guidance from federal 
judicial approaches to construing statutes, often they append their own 
perceptions respecting the best approach to carrying out legislative intent. 
For example, in Feldman v. Hunterdon Radiological Associates, 126 
while taking guidance from Clackamas, the New Jersey court observed that 
in Clackamas the Supreme Court "did not require its own six particularized 
prongs to be the sole standards; and opened the door to consideration of all 
factors relevant to power and control." 127 The New Jersey court, 
126. 901 A.2d 322 (N.J. 2006). 
127. Id. at 247. 
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accordingly, applied its own default definition of employment by taking 
principal guidance from the statute's  goals, explaining: 
Given [the statute]'s  broad remedial purpose of protecting workers 
whose whistle-blowing is of benefit to the health, safety and welfare of 
the public, in applying the fourth Clackamas factor courts should ask 
whether, because of a shareholder-director's  inability to influence an 
organization, he or she is "within the class of people that the statute was 
designed to protect." 128 
The broad range of common law tests of employment used by state courts, 
as well as alternative tests adopted by federal courts, is discussed more 
fully under section 1 .04, below. 
The Reporters' Notes to Comment c reference the Supreme Court's 
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. decision. 129 That decision, however, said 
nothing about when a worker-owner is precluded from employee status 
under legislation that provides employee protections or obligations. Bell 
Aerospace did not examine the question of what should be the default 
definition of employment in construing federal statutes; rather, the Court 
examined the Labor Management Relations Act's legislative history to 
discern Congress' intent respecting the class of employees protected by that 
Act and concluded that employees who exercise core managerial 
responsibilities are not among those employees Congress intended to 
protect. Therefore, Bell Aerospace offers no guidance respecting the 
subject of section 1 .03. Similarly irrelevant is Comment e 's  reference to the 
explicit FLSA exclusion of bona fide executive, administrative, and 
professional employees from federal minimum wage and overtime pay 
requirements, 130 because these exclusions have nothing to do with 
ownership or control but, rather, define the legislature's  perception of 
which employees need the protection of minimum and premium pay 
legislation. 
The Reporters' Notes correctly observe that the NLRB has treated the 
collective authority of employee-shareholders who have "effective voice in 
the formulation and determination of corporate policy," as removing them 
from the NLRA's protections. This proposition, however, is far from 
settled. The result was reached by a three member NLRB panel and has 
128. Id. at 248; see also D' Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co., 927 A.2d 1 13 (N.J. 2007) (holding that 
when deciding if someone is protected as an employee under the state whistleblower statute, the core 
question is whether that person's work is integral to the employer's business interests). In D 'Annunzio, 
the court stated that when dealing with specialized work, questions to be examined are: "Is the work 
continuous and required for the employer's business? Is the professional regularly at the employer's 
disposal? Is the professional required to perform routine or administrative activities? If so, an employer­
employee relationship more likely has been established." Id. at 1 14. 
129. 416 U.S. 267 (1974). 
1 30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1 77.06(c), (d), (e) (2000). 
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been questioned by one Board member who observed that the rule has 
never been fully explored. 131 Moreover, while there is doctrinal support for 
this approach in representation proceedings, based on the proposition that 
employee-shareholders who collectively wield such authority are managers 
and, as such, are not eligible to elect a certified bargaining 
representative, 1 32 it is inconsistent with the doctrine that the exercise of 
individual, as contrasted with collective, rights under the NLRA cannot be 
waived by the collective. 133 If the collective cannot waive individual 
NLRA rights, then the potential authority of the collective employee­
shareholders to have an effective voice in corporate policy should be 
irrelevant to an individual shareholder-employee who asserts an individual 
statutory claim for relief. Thus, this portion of the Reporters ' Notes should 
be deleted so as to not enshrine the dubious proposition that worker­
shareholders who have a voice in corporate affairs thereby lose their 
protections under section 7 of the NLRA. 
VI. SECTION 1 .04 
A. Text of Provision and Critique 
Section 1.04 Employees of Two or More Employers at the Same 
Time 
An individual is an employee of two or more employers if the 
employee and each of the employers meet the conditions of an 
employment relationship set forth in § 1.01 either 
(a) through the employee's service to each employer in separate 
courses of conduct, or 
(b) through the employee's service to each employer in one 
course of conduct. 
On its face, this section incorporates the black letter rule stated in 
section 1 .01 as the basis for determining whether there is an employment 
relationship. However, as seen below, the Comments to section 1 .04 state 
an approach that is more limiting than that stated in section 1 .01 and that 
has been adopted by many courts. In addition, as discussed below, the 
1 3 1 .  Citywide Corp. Transp., 338 N.L.R.B. 444, 445 (2002) (Liebman, concurring). Member 
Liebman further noted that any restriction based on the worker-shareholders' collective authority to 
effectively shape management policy should be limited to those situations in which the employee­
shareholders are not only heard but can also modify terms and conditions of employment in face of 
divergent interests of other shareholders or managers who have entrenched positions of power. Id. at 
445-46. 
1 32. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980). 
133. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 4 15  U.S. 322 ( 1974). 
2009] CRITIQUE OF RESTATEMENT CHAPTER I 7 1  
Reporters' description o f  the test for applying the proposed black letter rule 
stated in section 1.04 is marked by inconsistency and lack of clarity. 
Furthermore, different policy considerations apply to the question of 
whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor, the subject 
of section 1 .01 ,  than apply to the question of which of a group of possible 
employers stand in an employment relationship to a worker, the subject of 
section 1 .04. In the first instance, independent contractors are (at least in 
theory) able to protect themselves. In contrast, where the issue is whether 
particular parties are responsible for providing employee protections or 
obligations, a misguided rule may leave the employee, as an economically 
disadvantaged person, with no protections. For example, someone who is 
not an employee might lack any redress against an entity' s  racial, gender, 
religious, age, or disability discrimination. To implement the legislature' s  
goal o f  protecting weaker parties and ensuring that market decisions are 
based on merit, not prejudice, courts should reach for a broad definition of 
employment unless the legislation specifies otherwise or provides 
alternative avenues for carrying out its goals under such circumstances. The 
same is true with respect to whether a worker is within or beyond a welfare 
insurance plan such as unemployment or workers ' compensation. 
In some situations the issue is not whether the worker will receive any 
protection but rather which scheme of protection applies. For example, if a 
worker was tortiously injured and all possible employers are governed by 
the same statutory scheme, the employment decision controls whether a tort 
or an insurance benefit will be available and which employer or employers 
must pay for the remedy, at least in the first instance. In the long run, 
according to market theory, the actual cost often is passed along to 
employees collectively in the form of lower remuneration. On the other 
hand, if an injury was due to a worker' s  own carelessness or to 
unforeseeable or unpreventable cause, differences in employee protection 
schemes 1 34 may leave the victim without any benefit or with substantially 
reduced benefits depending on the resolution of the question of which 
employer or employers are proper respondents. Thus, the underlying (and 
not always enunciated) policy focus respecting the ability to bear and 
spread the risks, and availability of alternative remedial structures, do not 
lead to identical results in all multi-employer situations - a consideration 
not reflected in the Reporters' analysis or pronouncements respecting the 
correct tests of employment. Accordingly, the separate policy 
considerations respecting the multiple employer issue justify tests of 
1 34. An example would be the contrast between the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § §  
5 1 -60 (2000) and Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 3 3  U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (2000). 
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employment status that are more inclusive than those adopted in section 
1.01 and the policy considerations for allocating legal responsibilities 
among possible employers, the subject of section 1.04, may differ 
depending on the nature of the particular protections or obligations. 
B. Comments on Section 1.04 - Critique 
1 .  Comment a - Overview 
Comment a asserts that persons working for more than one employer 
most often do so in different time slots or periods. 1 35 Is there an empirical 
basis for that statement? Additionally, what is its significance, even if 
accurate, and what is the difference between "time slots" and "periods"? 
The Reporters' Notes for Comment a speak of protecting "servants or 
employees." 136 How does a servant differ from an employee? What is the 
justification for resorting to the outmoded term "servant"? 
2. Comment b - Working for Two or More Employers through Separate 
Courses of Conduct 
Comment b again refers to time slots and shifts. What is the difference 
and what is the empirical basis or significance for the assertion that it is 
rarer for workers to provide services to more than one employer during a 
general time period than to provide them at separate times? Crane 
operators, security guards, goods transfer handlers, and traffic monitors at 
construction sites and transportation hubs and terminals probably are more 
common examples of providers of such services than the ones offered. 
3. Comment c - Working for Two or More Employers through a Single 
Course of Conduct 
Comment c includes tests of whether there is an employment 
relationship. In addition to referencing section 1 .01 ,  Comment c treats as 
settled law the contention that actual control over the manner and means of 
performance, plus actual control over payment of the worker, are the 
criteria for determining the employment law responsibilities of lenders and 
borrowers of employee services. 137 The statement does not explain what 
result follows if but one of those two factors is present. 
In contrast, the last sentence in the same paragraph of Comment c is 
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1 .04 cmt. a. 
136. Id. reporters' notes cmt. a (emphasis added). 
1 37. Id. cmt. c, at 53 (emphasis added). 
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inconsistent with this statement. The last sentence asserts that the test of an 
employment relationship is whether the user has the power to direct work 
or set compensation. 1 38 That is, the first statement looks to actual exercise 
of authority whereas the last sentence describes formal authority. 
As with the first statement, it is unclear whether under the test stated 
in the last sentence there must be the power to control both work 
performance and pay. A possible implicit resolution of this conflict is 
presented by Illustration 4 to Comment c which says that employer 
responsibility is established based either on power to control compensation 
or on power to control work performance. 1 39 However, that does not clarify 
the previously noted discrepancies in Comment c, respecting authority to 
control as contrasted with actual control. 
Adding to the confusion, Illustration 6 to Comment c explains its 
result in terms of factors beyond those of control of compensation or work 
performance (for example, the lending employer' s  dependence on the 
assignments received from the borrower)140 even though the former are the 
sole factors listed in Comment c. 
Putting aside for a moment Comment e's  lack of consistency, it uses 
a very narrow test of employer responsibility in borrowed employee 
situations - a test that focuses only on performance and compensation 
control. Although the text of the black letter rule stated in section 1.04 
explicitly references the definition of employment set forth in section 1 .01 ,  
the criteria in Comment c to section 1 .04 are inconsistent with the section 
1 .01 criteria for distinguishing employment from independent contractor 
status. 
Section 1.01 distinguishes contractor independence from employment 
on the basis of authority over the various aspects of the relationship 
including the source of instrumentalities and tools, the duration of the 
relationship, the method of payment, the location of the work, and the 
ability to retain assistants. Control over the means and method of 
performance is just one factor to be weighed and is not of itself 
determinative. Unlike the section 1.01 approach, the test (or tests) in 
Comment c to section 1.04, by using much more limited criteria of 
employment, readily allows for evasion of employer responsibilities 
imposed by the legislature. Thus, in this age of marginalized and contingent 
workers, telecommuting, and reliance on employee innovation, creativity, 
and professional discretion, the section 1.01 standard would generally 
1 38. Id. (emphasis added). 
139. Id. cmt. c illus. 4. 
140. Id. illus. 6. 
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result in including more workers as employees than would the tests set out 
in Comment c. 141 Comment e's  limitation of the scope of employment 
status in borrowed employee situations, therefore, violates the principle of 
doctrinal consistency because it offers no justification for the use of 
different tests under these companion provisions. In addition, because 
justice requires that doubts be resolved in favor of inclusion when 
construing employee protective statutes, especially in situations in which a 
worker may be left without any protection or benefits, the greater flexibility 
and inclusiveness of section 1 .01 is a more appropriate approach for courts 
to follow than the narrow criteria proposed by Comment c. On the other 
hand, as previously discussed, differences could be justified if section 1 .04 
provided a broader definition of employment than is found in section 1 .01 
because, as discussed above and below, the section 1 .01 definition itself is 
probably too narrow for the issues addressed by section 1 .04. 
A further problem with Comment c is that the legal standard for 
allocating joint or separate employer responsibility in borrowed employee 
situations is far from settled; many court decisions conflict with the 
performance control and payment rules as stated in either of the ways in 
which they are presented in Comment c. That is not to say that the factors 
listed in Comment c are irrelevant to resolving this issue. Courts often 
emphasize them. However, courts sometimes ignore them and often go 
beyond them. 
When weighing the significance of a court's discussion of 
performance control where more than one purported principal is present, 
one should recognize that if the party the worker seeks to hold responsible 
as an employer, or the party that seeks to claim the immunities available as 
employer, exercises total control over the details of work performance, a 
finding of employer status based on evidence of performance control might 
obviate the need to explore other factors for imposing responsibility or 
immunities on a recipient of work efforts. Thus, when a court decision 
focuses on control of work performance or payment in finding employment 
status, it does not necessarily rule out other factors that might establish 
employment in the absence of such control. 
To the extent that the Comment c rule is governed by the actual 
control test, it conflicts with the U.S. Supreme Court' s  decision in Kelley v. 
Southern Pacific Co. , in which the Court held that, for purposes of the 
14 1 .  See Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and 
Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 53, 1 58-60 (2003); 
Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers 
without Workplaces and Employees without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 25 1,  279-80 
(2006). 
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Federal Employers' Liability Act, a party will be an employer of a 
borrowed employee if it either controls or has the right to control the 
employee's physical conduct. 142 More importantly, the Court in Kelley did 
not attempt to adopt the "either controls or has the right to control" test as a 
general rule for defining employee status and it has used other criteria 
when enforcing other federal statutes. 143 
Although the "either controls or has the right to control" test was 
adopted in the Restatement, (Third) of Agency in a provision designed to 
ascertain respondeat superior responsibility, 144 that test represents neither 
settled law nor sound policy for dealing with employee protective statutes. 
Moreover, the comments to that provision describe operative facts that go 
beyond mere questions of performance control in determining whether a 
principal is an employer in borrowed employee situations. 145 These include 
the duration of the worker' s presence in the workplace and the source of 
training and of tools needed to perform the work. 146 Thus, even for 
respondeat superior purposes, the latest Restatement of Agency allows for a 
more expanded notion of employment than is presented in Comment c. 
While the Supreme Court' s  decision in Kelley recited a test of 
employment that focuses only on control of a worker' s  physical conduct, it 
was dealing with a situation in which that means of identifying the 
worker's employer did not leave the worker unprotected or without 
benefits. 147 Rather, Kelley' s  injury was covered at the least by state 
workers' compensation benefits. 148 Nevertheless, he was seeking additional 
tort recovery under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). 149 That 
statute, which applies to railroad workers 150 (and, through the Jones Act, to 
seafarers 15 1 ) almost always offers an avenue of added benefits for 
employees seeking remedies for their injury or illness. Even if an FELA 
suit is barred by the failure to prove employment or the failure to prove the 
requisite fault, the injured worker will almost always be able to recover a 
state workers' compensation benefit or a compensation benefit under the 
generally more generous Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation 
1 42. 4 19  U.S. 3 1 8, 331-32 ( 1974). 
143. Id. at 324-32. 
1 44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006). 
145. Id. cmt. d(2). 
146. Id. 
1 47. Kelley, 4 1 9  U.S. at 332. 
148. Id. at 321 .  
149. Id. at 322. 
1 50. 45 u.s.c. §§ 5 1 -60 (2000). 
1 5 1 .  46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2000). 
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Act, 152 or under mandatory railway worker disability insurance, 1 53 or under 
the maritime doctrine of maintenance and cure. 1 54 Additionally, a seafarer 
whose PELA recovery is blocked by inability to prove employment status 
with the vessel may still have a tort type remedy under the maritime 
doctrine of unseaworthiness. 1 55 Accordingly, the relatively narrow 
employment status lines drawn by the Supreme Court for PELA (broader, 
nevertheless, than those that are recommended by Comment c) do not pose 
a serious risk of leaving employees without protection. 
It is not surprising, then, that when determining the scope of 
employment responsibilities under the much broader reaching PLSA, the 
Supreme Court has taken a more flexible approach. That approach goes 
well beyond the common law's traditional focus on control of work 
activities, using instead an economic reality test that looks to such factors 
as the source of the opportunity to work, the payment for the work, and the 
regimentation of the work product. 156 As a result of this broader approach 
to employee status, if work is performed on the borrower' s  premises by 
employees of a lender that has no other customers, and the work is integral 
to the borrower' s  operations, the borrower is jointly liable for any PLSA 
pay deficiencies. 157 
In like regard, in Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 158 the appellate 
court held that when determining whether a party is an employer for 
purposes of PLSA responsibilities it must consider the economic realities 
and weigh the permanence or duration of the working relationship and the 
extent to which the work is an integral part of the employer' s  business. 
Although the Zheng decision is cited in the Reporters' Notes to support two 
illustrative examples used in the Comments respecting the element of 
payment as evidence of employment, the Reporters overlook the decision's 
significance in supporting a test of employment that goes well beyond the 
narrow elements listed in Comment c. 
Numerous other decisions have observed that determination of 
employment status under the PLSA requires examination of the totality of 
the circumstances to ascertain whether the putative employee is 
1 52. 33 u.s.c. §§ 903-50 (2000). 
153. See 45 U.S.C. § 352 (providing for pay for temporary disabilities under the mandatory 
Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act) 
1 54. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 1 58 (1903) (although a vessel is not liable to a seaman for negligence 
resulting in personal injury, the seaman is entitled to recover for his maintenance and cure). 
155. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549-50 (1960). 
1 56. Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961). 
1 57. Reyes v. Remington Hybrid Seed Co., Inc., 495 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 2007) (analyzing 
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1 947)). 
1 58. 355 F.3d 6 1 ,  67 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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economically dependent on the alleged employer. Hence, in Baystate 
Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, the court ruled that under the FLSA 
the absence of direct, on-site supervision does not preclude a determination 
that a lending ehtity shares with the borrower the status of employer of 
temporary workers. 159 Like the Zheng decision, this case is cited in the 
Reporters' Notes to support two illustrative examples respecting the 
element of payment as evidence of employment. Again, the Reporters 
overlook the decision' s  greater significance in supporting a test of 
employment that is broader and more flexible than the narrow elements 
listed in Comment c. 
Similarly, the Reporters ' Notes portray Antenor v. D & S Farms 160 as 
a decision using the test of the employer's power to control the work and 
effectively determine compensation. However, the court's opinion set forth 
eight factors to be weighed including the right, directly or indirectly, to 
hire, fire, or modify employment conditions; the ownership of the facilities 
where the work occurs; whether the work is integral to the enterprise; and 
the parties' respective investments in equipment and facilities. 161 Further, 
the court in Antenor explained that no one factor is determinative; rather 
the employment relationship depends on the economic reality of all the 
circumstances, and that ultimately it must be determined whether the 
workers are economically dependent on the lender and borrower of their 
labor. 162 
The Reporters' Notes also offer a misleading account of Moreau v. Air 
France, 163 which decided that under the Family and Medical Leave Act an 
airline was not a joint employer of employees of contractors that provided 
ramp and towing services, baggage handling, and food preparation. The 
1 59. 163 F.3d 668 (!st Cir. 1998); see also Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730 (determination 
of the employment relationship depends on the circumstances of the whole activity). 
1 60. 88 F.3d 925 (I Ith Cir. 1 996). 
16 1 .  Id. at 932. 
162. Id. The same observation regarding the Reporters' failure to acknowledge broader tests used in 
cases they cite is applicable to Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434 (I Ith Cir. 1 994) where the 
court explained: 
To determine whether an employer/employee relationship exists for purposes of federal 
welfare legislation, we look not to the common law definitions of those terms (for instance, to 
tests measuring the amount of control an ostensible employer exercised over a putative 
employee), but rather to the 'economic reality' of all the circumstances concerning whether 
the putative employee is economically dependent upon the alleged employer." 
Id. at 439; accord Torres-Lopez v. May, l l  l F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1 997). In Torres-Lopez, also cited by 
the Reporters, the court found joint employer responsibility, relying on such factors unrelated to 
performance or payment control as the ownership interest in the premises and equipment, the amount of 
investment in equipment and materials, the ability to shift activities from one source of income to 
· another, the opportunity for profit or loss depending upon managerial skill, and the extent to which the 
work effort was an integral part of the business of the user of the workers' services. Id. at 639-41 .  
1 63. 343 F.3d l l79 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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Reporters'  Notes assert that the court "stressed that Air France did not 
share in the control of the means and manner of work or the compensation 
of the servers." Although those factors had been stressed in the district 
court decision, the appellate court criticized that focus as "a bit narrow in 
the circumstances of this case," 164 and affirmed the district court' s  
conclusion only after weighing numerous other relevant factors including: 
use of shared premises with the ground handling companies, a provider' s  
temporary subleasing o f  space from the airline, an arrangement giving the 
airline a small office area in a provider' s  facility, the premises where most 
work was performed, the source of capital investment in most of the 
equipment used in providing the services, the ability to shift business 
operations to serving other entities, the performance of such services for 
other entities, the source of employee opportunities for promotion, and the 
extent to which the work was integral to the respective businesses. 165 
Department of Labor regulations under the FMLA also reflect a broad 
understanding of the employment relationship (not fully revealed by the 
Reporters' Notes referencing the regulations in Comment e) and include 
situations in which an employee performs work that simultaneously 
benefits two or more employers and situations in which one employer acts 
directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer in relation to the 
employee. 166 Pointedly, the DOL regulations specify that determination of 
joint employment "is not determined by the application of any single 
criterion, but rather the entire relationship is to be viewed in its totality." 167 
Moreover, the regulation establishes a presumption of joint employment 
when a temporary or leasing agency supplies employees to a second 
employer. 168 
Nor, as previously indicated, have the federal courts followed the 
Supreme Court's relatively narrow Kelley approach when applying other 
federal employee-protective statutes that regulate benefits for work injuries. 
For example, in Brown v. Union Oil Co., 169 in determining whether the 
defendant was the injured worker' s  employer under the Longshore and 
Harbor Workers Compensation Act, and therefore immune from tort 
liability, the court of appeals applied a nine factor test, and control of 
performance was only one element. As is so often recited, the court held 
164. Id. at 1 190. 
165. Id. at 1 190-9 1 .  
166. 2 9  CFR § 825.106 (2008). 
167. Id. § 825 . 106(b)(I ). 
1 68. Id. 
169. 984 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). 
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that "no single factor, or combination of them, is determinative." 170 Other 
factors included whether the employee acquiesced in the new arrangement, 
whether there was a continuing relationship with the lender employer, the 
duration of the borrowing arrangement, and who could dismiss the 
employee. 17 1  The authority to set the compensation (a determinative factor 
according to Illustration 4) is not among those listed by the appellate court. 
It should be noted that distinguishing the Longshore and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act from the PELA is the fact that those covered by the 
Compensation Act, such as self-injured overseas employees of defense 
contractors, may not have any other recourse if they are deemed to not be 
employed by one of the joint employers. Hence, the legislative purpose of 
this welfare benefit law justifies a broad, flexible approach to ascertaining 
whether a claimant is within the protected class. 
The federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) requires an 
employer to furnish "employees employment and a place of employment 
which are free from recognized hazards . . .  likely to cause serious physical 
harm to his employees." 172 Despite over three decades of disputes 
respecting the application of that language to borrowed employee 
situations, OSHA law on the issue is not fully settled. Nevertheless, the 
leading treatise in the field states, "In determining liability, the 
Commission and the courts have rejected the common law concept . . .  , but 
have focused on business reality and the purposes of the Act." 173 
Accordingly, several circuits hold that a borrower employer has 
responsibility under the Act if it has knowledge of a violation of OSHA 
regulations and the ability to abate it regardless of its control over workers 
who are exposed to the hazard. 174 
There also are numerous state court decisions arising in a variety of 
common law and statutory contexts that reject the rule stated in the second 
and third sentences of Comment c. For example, Alabama courts hold that 
the employer in borrowed employee situations is the party that has the 
reserved right to control the employee, not the party that actually exercises 
control. Power over compensation is not part of that court' s  quite narrow 
and inflexible approach. 175 
1 70. Id. at 676. 
1 7 1 .  Id.; accord Guillory v. Gukutu, 534 F. Supp. 2d 267 (D.R.!. 2008). 
1 72. 29 u .s.c. § 65 1 (2000). 
1 73 .  MARK ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 163 (1 998). 
1 74. MICA Corp. v. OSHRC, 295 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Universal Constr. Co. v. 
OSHRC, 1 82 F.3d 726 (10th Cir. 1 999); U.S. v. Pitt.-Des Moines, Inc., 168 F.3d 976 (7th Cir. 1999). 
1 75. W.G. Yates & Sons Constr. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., Civil Action 06-0803-WS-B, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18 16  (S.D. Ala. Jan. 8, 2008). 
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The default position for deciding whether a borrowing employer has 
respondeat superior responsibility for the borrowed employee's negligent 
acts under North Carolina law calls for the fact finder to weigh, among 
other things: the nature of the work to be performed, which employer 
supplies the instrumentalities used to perform the work, the nature of those 
instrumentalities, the duration of the employment, whether the temporary 
employer has the skill or knowledge to control the manner in which the 
work is performed, and whether the temporary employer in fact exercises 
performance control. 176 Further, absent evidence to the contrary, the North 
Carolina rule presumes that the lending employer retains the right of 
control. 177 Additionally, in North Carolina a party that benefits from work 
that it knows or should have known was either ultra-hazardous or 
inherently dangerous, is liable for the worker' s  injuries resulting from that 
hazard even though it did not control work performance. 178 
In South Carolina the definition of employment looks to four 
factors: the right or exercise of control, furnishing of equipment, right to 
dismiss, and method of payment. 179 California courts have ruled that 
factors to be weighed in finding whether the state workers' compensation 
statute immunizes the lending employer from a tort suit by an injured 
employee include: the duration of the lending arrangement, which 
employer' s  payroll listed the loaned employee · at the time of the injury, 
which employer had the authority to dismiss the loaned employee, and the 
degree of discretion available to the loaned employee in performing the 
assignment. 1 80 
The Indiana bench holds that to determine if an employer-employee 
relationship exists with respect to a loaned worker under its workers' 
compensation act, the fact finder should weigh: whether the purported 
employer has authority to dismiss the worker, the mode of payment, who 
supplies tools or equipment, who controls the method of work assignment 
and performance, and the duration of employment. 181  The Indiana court 
further explains that this is a balancing test in which the right to exercise 
control over the employee should receive the greatest weight. 182 
176. Pettiford v. City of Greensboro, 556 F. Supp. 2d 5 12, 536 (M.D. N.C. 2008). Similar criteria 
have been attributed to application of the New York workers' compensation law. Campos v. I. Grace 
Co. New England, LLC, No. 06-Civ. 2466 (RWS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87393 (S.D. N.Y. Nov. 27, 
2007); see also ilifra note 183 and accompanying text. 
1 77. Pettiford, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 5 1 2. 
1 78. Kinsey v. Spann, 533 S.E.2d 487, 490 (N.C. 2000) 
1 79. Nelson v. Yellow Cab Co., 564 S.E.2d 1 1 0, 1 1 2- 13  (S.C. 2002). 
1 80. Marsh v. Tilley Steel Co., 606 P.2d 355 (Cal. 1 980). 
1 8 1 .  Hale v. Kemp, 579 N.E.2d 63, 67 (Ind. 1 99 1 ). 
182. GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Ind. 2001). 
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And, in New York it has been held that where a worker has dual 
responsibilities it is enough to hold a party liable for workers' 
compensation benefits if it created a web of relationships to receive the 
benefits of the worker's  services even though that party did not pay the 
worker but had authority to remove him from the status that provided his 
income such as by excluding the individual from the work premises. 1 83 
As previously explained, on several occasions the Reporters' Notes 
cite for other purposes decisions that use a far broader definition of 
employment, but they ignore the teaching of those decisions respecting 
employment in borrowed or dual employer situations. Additional examples 
of this include NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., where, when 
reviewing whether a paid union organizer can simultaneously be an 
employee of an enterprise whose workers he is trying to organize, the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated that the meaning of "employee" under the NLRA is 
not based on the narrow traditional common law of agency definition of 
employee but instead takes guidance from "the breadth of the ordinary 
dictionary definition." 184 
Similarly, the Reporters ' Notes cite Dunkin ' Donuts Mid-Atlantic 
Distribution Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 1 85 in support of the proposition that 
workers can be employed jointly by multiple employers, but the discussion 
overlooks the significance of the appellate court's  observation in that case 
that employment status was correctly established based on varying levels of 
involvement in decisions relating to hiring, discipline, assignment of work 
and equipment, compensation levels, and recognition and awards. 186 The 
Reporters' Notes also cite another case for the same proposition respecting 
the possibility of joint employment, but ignore the significance of the fact 
that employment status with the entity that assigned part time workers to 
the one for whom they performed services was based on the former entity's 
maintenance of the referral roster, issuance of the workers' paychecks, and 
control over their rate of pay and other benefits 187 - factors that Comment c 
183 .  Palmer v. State Univ. of N.Y. Upstate Med. Univ., 787 N.Y.S.2d 489 (App. Div.), appeal 
denied, 842 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 2005). 
1 84. 5 1 6  U.S. 85, 90 ( 1995). Although finding that the NLRB's discretion in such cases is not 
confined by common law concepts, the Court did examine the facts in light of the Restatement (Second) 
of Agency and found no conflict between the NLRB's finding and the Restatement rules respecting 
employee status. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 226 cmt. a, at 499 (1957). 
1 85 .  363 F.3d 437 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
1 86. See id. at 440-41 . 
1 87. NLRB v. W. Temp. Servs., Inc., 82 1 F.2d 1258, 1266-67 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Rutherford 
Food Corp. v. McComb, 33 1 U.S. 722 (1947); Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co. Inc., 355 F.3d (2d Cir. 
2003); Baystate Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668 ( ! st Cir. 1 998); NLRB v. Browning­
Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 F.2d 1 1 1 7 (3d Cir. 1 982) (joint employment where multiple entities share or co­
determine key matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment). 
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adopts in part but not in their entirety. 
The concluding sentence in the paragraph in which the Reporters ' 
Notes discuss these and similar cases reads: "As an employer may have 
responsibility under the NLRA to bargain collectively over any subject that 
may control, the power to control test fits well the purposes of this 
statute." 188 In addition to being an inaccurate reflection of the NLRB' s  
approach to such cases and an incomplete and unclear description o f  the 
duty to bargain, this statement does not reveal the significance of the 
breadth of bargaining subjects, which includes numerous issues unrelated 
to work performance or pay. Nor does it give proper weight to the 
feasibility of joint employer bargaining as evidenced by the long history of 
multi-employer bargaining in the U.S. and in other free market economies. 
Thus, if the duty to bargain helps define who is an employee under the 
NLRA, the breadth of the duty to bargain should justify weighing factors 
far beyond the two control elements recited in Comment c. 
The Reporters ' Notes also inaccurately assert that employment 
discrimination cases involving questions of joint employment "generally 
have applied the same functional test" as is used under the FLSA189 - a test 
the Reporters' Notes, as explained above, mischaracterize as relying on 
control of performance and pay. 190 McMullin v. Ashcroft, 191 the most recent 
of the cited decisions, arose under the Americans With Disabilities and the 
Rehabilitation Acts. 1 92 There the breadth of the court' s  analysis, as in so 
many other cases, went beyond performance control and payment. Rather, 
the court more broadly asked whether one or both entities exercised 
significant control over the essential terms and conditions of the worker' s  
employment and sought its answer by looking at such factors a s  their co­
determination of the worker's initial and continuing qualifications for the 
position, their respective roles in selecting the worker, their respective 
abilities to remove the worker and shape job responsibilities, and 
identifying which party equipped the worker. 193 
In contrast to the statement in the Reporters ' Notes respecting the test 
for an employment relationship in discrimination cases, the Eleventh 
Circuit in Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs. , a Title VII case, looked not to 
FLSA decisions but to NLRB cases, stating that the question of fact to be 
1 88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1 .04 reporters notes, at 58. 
1 89. Id. at 59. 
190. The cases cited in the Notes in support of this statement are all district court decisions. Id. 
19 1 .  337 F.  Supp. 2d 1281  (D. Wyo. 2004). 
192. Which Act applied depended on whether the employer was the supplier or user of the worker's 
services. 
193. McMullin, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1 294, 1297. 
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resolved is whether the alleged employer has sufficient control of the terms 
and conditions of employment. 194 The terms and conditions of 
employment, of course, cover numerous aspects of the relationship 
unrelated to control of compensation or work performance. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
To the extent to which a Restatement is intended to provide a clear, 
accurate statement respecting existing "majority" or consensus rules, 
sections 1.02, 1.03, and 1 .04 do not achieve that goal. Majority or 
consensus rules have not been accurately identified and largely do not exist 
with respect to the subjects of these three sections. In addition, the stated 
black letter rules lack completeness and precision, in some cases are 
contradicted by the reiteration of those rules in the Comments, seldom are 
explicated with supportive doctrinal or empirical analysis, and the few parts 
where analysis is offered it is far from exhaustive. Moreover, the 
Reporters' Notes have numerous incorrect or misleading representations of 
case decisions and other authorities. 
Restatements, even when accurate and clear ought to do more than 
summarize consensus rules and settled doctrinal explanations. American 
Law Reports, American Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris already do that 
and do so in a way that is regularly updated. So do the more concise (and 
thereby generally less useful) treatises. Based on the traditional role of 
Restatements, judges, scholars, and practitioners look to ALI work 
products for something more. They are sources for furthering the process of 
synthesizing and refining the common law so as to better fulfill the goals of 
justice. 
One aspect of promoting justice is to hold people and legal entities to 
that conduct which the community expects of them - enforcement of the 
community' s  normative expectations. However, a problem in applying that 
approach is that as communities become larger and more complex, it is 
more difficult to identify accurately a single set of normative expectations 
for the employment relationship. Also, owners, managers, workers, and 
judges do not necessarily share expectations respecting the fair allocation 
of employment rights and obligations. In addition, as enterprises expand 
into diverse communities, the participants' understanding of normative 
behavior can be expected both to change and to vary. Those expanded, 
diverse communities often extend beyond national boundaries and a not 
insignificant portion of that part of our workforce most often targeted by 
1 94. 30 F .3d 1 350 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 994). 
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protective legislation has at least one foot in cultures that are not part of 
mainstream America. Therefore, it is appropriate to seek guidance from 
sources that reflect external and global normative standards. There should 
be nothing startling in this proposition. Such American legal classics as the 
Federalist Papers and early Supreme Court decisions reveal that American 
jurists and scholars working in an age when this nation had little else 
besides the common law regularly sought guidance from French, German, 
and Roman legal sources as well as from British and other authorities. 
Additionally, as technology changes, so too are there important 
changes in the normative expectations. For example, discovering who is an 
employee by examining the extent of control over performance is less and 
less relevant when workers are hired to innovate, to create, or to 
telecommute from their homes. One neglected source of guidance 
respecting such changes can be found in the trends of legislative reform. 
However, the Comments and Reporters' Notes accompanying sections 
1 .02, 1 .03, and 1 .04 do not reveal an effort to seek guidance from this 
source or from other sources to gain a broader understanding of the 
normative expectations of the employment relationship in the changing 
work environment. 
Further, as the best common law jurists from Coke to Cardozo have 
shown, the common law should be more than simply a reflection of 
normative expectations. Those who apply the law should not lose sight of 
the goals of justice - protect the weak from exploitation by the strong, 
ensure honest dealings, adjust legal relationships based on neutral 
considerations, distribute burdens to those who can carry them with the 
least pain (often by redistributing them to a broader community), and place 
risks on the shoulders of those best able to minimize the threatened harm. 
In those parts of the text examined above, the rules, comments, and notes 
do not reveal an effort to improve our system of justice either by analyzing 
the impact of the proposed rules or by seeking guidance beyond the 
confines of our own institutions. 
Several years ago, Professor Guy Davidov offered a carefully 
explicated analysis of the contemporary concept of employment in a 
variety of advanced economies (including the U.S.) with an eye to best 
implement legislative regimes for employee protections and obligations. 
Building upon a draft guideline being developed by the ILO, he offered and 
justified an approach that weighs ten factors, with none being 
determinative. 195 These are: 
195. Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Characterization of Workers 
in Need of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357, 402-09 (2002). 
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(1) The extent to which the user enterprise determines when and how 
work should be performed, including working time and other conditions of 
work of the worker; 
(2) the extent of supervisory authority and control of the user 
enterprise over the worker with respect to the work performed, including 
disciplinary authority; 
(3) the extent to which the user enterprise makes investments and 
provides tools, materials and machinery, among other things, to perform 
the work concerned; 
( 4) whether the worker has the ability to spread her risks-among 
different clients, different suppliers, or others; 
(5) whether the work is performed on a regular and continuous basis; 
( 6) whether the worker works for a single user enterprise; 
(7) the extent to which the work performed is integrated into the 
organizational or bureaucratic control of the user enterprise; 
(8) whether the user enterprise provides substantial job-specific 
training to the worker; 
(9) whether the worker is free to refuse work; and 
(10) whether the worker can send substitutes to do the work. 
Rather than subjugating employment law to the agency tests of vicarious 
liability, when correcting and revising their draft for Chapter 1, the 
Reporters ought to reconsider the tests offered in sections 1.02, 1.03, and 
1.04 in iight of Professor Davidov's thoughtful recommendations. 
Finally, the Chapter is incomplete in its coverage. There are contexts 
in which law has a need to define the boundaries and characteristics of 
employment relations that go beyond those explored in Chapter 1. For 
example, employees are guests at the place where they perform their work. 
Are or should the definitions of the relationship that drive vicarious liability 
rules and trespass rules for employees be similar to or the same as those 
that drive rules respecting responsibilities toward other categories of 
guests? What about bailments? Is one a gratuitous bailee and the other a 
commercial bailee? If so, which is which? Are the employee' s  tools or 
other personal property deserving of the same or different protection by the 
principal than are those of an independent contractor? As another example, 
the issue of apparent authority is, in a sense, the contractual equivalent of 
vicarious liability. Should the same rules apply for finding apparent 
authority to make a contractual undertaking as apply for finding vicarious 
liability? Should the guidelines respecting apparent authority be the same 
for a worker with respect to dealings with low level supervisors and same 
level co-workers as they are for third parties? Based on a key-word search 
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of Chapter 1 ,  it does not appear that the drafters have examined any of 
these questions. 
There are other common law questions that arise out of employment 
relations that do not seem to have been considered in defining employment, 
though, perhaps they are covered elsewhere in the total document including 
the parts yet to be written. Copyright law makes certain presumptions 
based on employee status, including common law exceptions based on 
employment as a teacher. Key-word searching the chapter shows a couple 
of parenthetical references to cases citing the federal copyright statute but 
no analysis respecting the appropriateness or inappropriateness of treating 
or not treating someone as an employee for purposes of copyright but not 
for other purposes. Similarly, the common law shop right claim to equitable 
use of a patent is based on employee status. Should that status be defined in 
the same manner for this purpose as for the purpose of determining 
vicarious liability or determining coverage under employee protective 
legislation? Addressing these questions is a necessary part of any 
restatement of the law governing the employment relationship. 
